Mike Griffith
April 28th, 2009, 7:09 am
What follows is a condensed version of an article of mine that's been published on the Veterans Today website. The full version can be found at this link:
http://www.veteranstoday.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=6085
MYTH: The planned attack on Los Angeles was not prevented by waterboarding, and no other crucial intelligence was gained from waterboarding either.
FACT: This myth is refuted by the interrogation memos. I quote from the memos:
* "Before the CIA used enhanced techniques . . . KSM [Khalid Sheikh Mohammed] resisted giving any answers to questions about future attacks, simply noting, 'Soon you will find out.' "
* "Interrogations have led to specific, actionable intelligence, as well as a general increase in the amount of intelligence regarding al Qaeda and its affiliates."
* [The interrogations] "led to the discovery of a KSM plot, the 'Second Wave,' 'to use East Asian operatives to crash a hijacked airliner into' a building in Los Angeles" and "information obtained from KSM also led to the capture of Riduan bin Isomuddin, better known as Hambali, and the discovery of the Guraba Cell, a 17-member Jemmah Islamiyah cell tasked with executing the 'Second Wave.' "
MYTH: Waterboarding could not have prevented the planned attack on Los Angeles because the attack was discovered months before harsh methods began to be used.
FACT: For one thing, as shown above, the released CIA interrogation memos state that waterboarding enabled us to prevent the planned attack on Los Angeles.
The claim about the timing is based on former FBI interrogator Ali Soufan's widely circulated article in the New York Times. Therein Soufan says,
"I questioned him [Zubaydah] from March to June 2002, before the harsh techniques were introduced later in August."
"As for Mr. Padilla, the dates just don't add up: the harsh techniques were approved in the memo of August 2002, Mr. Padilla had been arrested that May." ("My Tortured Decision," New York Times, April 23, 2009)
But the Department of Justice's report on the FBI's role in the interrogations notes that harsh methods began to be used "within days" of Zubaydah's capture in Pakistan in late March 2002 (Department of Justice Report: A Review of the FBI's Involvement in and Observations of Detainee Interrogations in Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan, and Iraq, May 2008, pp. 67-69).
Soufan himself has told Newsweek that "rough and unorthodox interrogation tactics" and "aggressive techniques" were already approved and being used in April 2002. It's difficult to pin down Soufan on this issue because at times he draws a distinction between waterboarding and other harsh methods. But it is clear that he himself has acknowledged that harsh methods were used several months before August 2002, contrary to his statements in his New York Times editorial.
In addition, Newsweek has acknowledged that Soufan's story has been challenged by CIA officials:
"CIA officials dispute Soufan's argument that harsh methods weren't productive. They say that early on, Zubaydah stopped talking-and that after the FBI agents left the scene, the enhanced interrogations produced important information that led to the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh, a key 9/11 plotter."
It should also be mentioned that the other FBI interrogator who observed the CIA's harsh interrogations of Zubaydah did not agree with Soufan's objections to them. This agent, named "Gibson" in the DOJ report, told DOJ investigators that he saw nothing wrong with the CIA's methods:
"Gibson stated after he returned to the United States he told D'Amuro that he did not have a moral objection to being present for the CIA techniques because the CIA was acting professionally and Gibson himself had undergone comparable harsh interrogation techniques as part of U.S. Army Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) training." (Department of Justice Report: A Review of the FBI's Involvement in and Observations of Detainee Interrogations in Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan, and Iraq, May 2008, p. 69)
The interrogation memos note that after "enhanced" methods, i.e., harsh methods, were used on Zubaydah and KSM they became "pivotal sources" of information on Al Qaeda:
". . . since the use of enhanced techniques, ‘KSM and Zubaydah have been pivotal sources because of their ability and willingness to provide their analysis and speculations about the capabilities, methodologies, and mindsets of terrorists.'"
MYTH: The abuse of the three terrorists who were waterboarded is part of an overall pattern of abuse in American interrogation operations at Guantanamo and in Iraq and Afghanistan.
FACT: An independent review of our interrogation operations concluded in 2006 reached a very different conclusion. William Mcswain is one of the attorneys who took part in that investigation. He's in a unique position to comment on this matter, because he not only participated in the investigation but also underwent waterboarding as part of his military training. He says the following on this matter in an editorial published today in the Wall Street Journal:
". . . military interrogation is not akin to a friendly chat across a conference table -- nor is it designed to gather evidence in a criminal trial, as an FBI interview might be. There is a fundamental distinction between law enforcement and military interrogations that we ignore at our peril.
"Second-guessers can also fail to appreciate the increased importance of interrogation (and human intelligence in general) in the post 9/11 world. We face an enemy that wears no uniform, blends in with civilian populations, and operates in the shadows. This has made eliciting information from captured terrorists vital to the effort of finding other terrorists. As interrogation has become more important, drawing out useful information has become more difficult -- because hardened terrorists are often trained to resist traditional U.S. interrogation methods.
"Fortunately, aggressive interrogation techniques like those outlined in the memos to the CIA are effective. As the memos explain, high-value detainees like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), the mastermind of 9/11, and Abu Zubaydah, one of Osama bin Laden's key lieutenants, provided no actionable intelligence when facing traditional U.S. methods. It is doubtful that any high-level al Qaeda operative would ever provide useful intelligence in response to traditional methods.
"Yet KSM and Zubaydah provided critical information after being waterboarded -- information that, among other things, helped to prevent a ‘Second Wave' attack in Los Angeles, according to the memos. Similarly, the 2005 report by Vice Adm. Albert Church on Defense Department interrogation policies, the ‘Church Report' -- of which I served as the executive editor -- documented the success of aggressive techniques against high-value detainees like Mohamed al Kahtani, 9/11's ‘20th hijacker.'
"The aggressive techniques in the CIA memos are also undeniably safe, having been adopted from Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape (SERE) training used with our own troops.
"I have personally been waterboarded, put into stress positions, sleep deprived, slapped in the face. While none of this was enjoyable, I am none the worse for wear.
"While such techniques are used in U.S. military training, some apparently consider them too brutal, too abusive, too inhumane -- in short, too much like ‘torture' -- to be used on fanatics like KSM who are bent on the mass murder of innocent American civilians. And if legal advisers such as Steven G. Bradbury, Jay S. Bybee and John Yoo are to be prosecuted for having sanctioned their use under careful controls, who's next? Every commander who ever implemented a SERE course?
"Many critics also play the Abu Ghraib ‘trump card': The abuses of prisoners at that facility in Iraq allegedly ‘prove' the Bush administration's supposed policy of abuse, first codified in its legal memos. This ignores all relevant evidence.
"As the Church Report concluded, after a thorough review of all Defense Department interrogation policies, the pictured abuses at Abu Ghraib bore no resemblance to approved policies at any level, in any theater. The 2004 Independent Panel to Review Department of Defense Detention Operations -- whose four members included two former secretaries of defense under President Jimmy Carter -- also stated that ‘no approved procedures called for or allowed the kinds of abuse that in fact occurred. There is no evidence of a policy of abuse promulgated by senior officials or military authorities.'
"Similarly, the critics like to default to Guantanamo as a symbol of the kind of abuse that Mr. Bush's antiterror policies allowed. Yet, at the time of the Church Report, there had been more than 24,000 interrogation sessions at Guantanamo and only three cases of substantiated interrogation-related abuse. All of them consisted of minor assaults in which military interrogators had exceeded the bounds of approved interrogation policy. Notably, the Church Report found that detainees at Guantanamo were more likely to have been injured playing recreational sports than in confrontations with interrogators or guards." ("Misconceptions About the Interrogation Memos," Wall Street Journal, April 26, 2009; see link below)
Again, the full version can be found at the link given above.
http://www.veteranstoday.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=6085
MYTH: The planned attack on Los Angeles was not prevented by waterboarding, and no other crucial intelligence was gained from waterboarding either.
FACT: This myth is refuted by the interrogation memos. I quote from the memos:
* "Before the CIA used enhanced techniques . . . KSM [Khalid Sheikh Mohammed] resisted giving any answers to questions about future attacks, simply noting, 'Soon you will find out.' "
* "Interrogations have led to specific, actionable intelligence, as well as a general increase in the amount of intelligence regarding al Qaeda and its affiliates."
* [The interrogations] "led to the discovery of a KSM plot, the 'Second Wave,' 'to use East Asian operatives to crash a hijacked airliner into' a building in Los Angeles" and "information obtained from KSM also led to the capture of Riduan bin Isomuddin, better known as Hambali, and the discovery of the Guraba Cell, a 17-member Jemmah Islamiyah cell tasked with executing the 'Second Wave.' "
MYTH: Waterboarding could not have prevented the planned attack on Los Angeles because the attack was discovered months before harsh methods began to be used.
FACT: For one thing, as shown above, the released CIA interrogation memos state that waterboarding enabled us to prevent the planned attack on Los Angeles.
The claim about the timing is based on former FBI interrogator Ali Soufan's widely circulated article in the New York Times. Therein Soufan says,
"I questioned him [Zubaydah] from March to June 2002, before the harsh techniques were introduced later in August."
"As for Mr. Padilla, the dates just don't add up: the harsh techniques were approved in the memo of August 2002, Mr. Padilla had been arrested that May." ("My Tortured Decision," New York Times, April 23, 2009)
But the Department of Justice's report on the FBI's role in the interrogations notes that harsh methods began to be used "within days" of Zubaydah's capture in Pakistan in late March 2002 (Department of Justice Report: A Review of the FBI's Involvement in and Observations of Detainee Interrogations in Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan, and Iraq, May 2008, pp. 67-69).
Soufan himself has told Newsweek that "rough and unorthodox interrogation tactics" and "aggressive techniques" were already approved and being used in April 2002. It's difficult to pin down Soufan on this issue because at times he draws a distinction between waterboarding and other harsh methods. But it is clear that he himself has acknowledged that harsh methods were used several months before August 2002, contrary to his statements in his New York Times editorial.
In addition, Newsweek has acknowledged that Soufan's story has been challenged by CIA officials:
"CIA officials dispute Soufan's argument that harsh methods weren't productive. They say that early on, Zubaydah stopped talking-and that after the FBI agents left the scene, the enhanced interrogations produced important information that led to the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh, a key 9/11 plotter."
It should also be mentioned that the other FBI interrogator who observed the CIA's harsh interrogations of Zubaydah did not agree with Soufan's objections to them. This agent, named "Gibson" in the DOJ report, told DOJ investigators that he saw nothing wrong with the CIA's methods:
"Gibson stated after he returned to the United States he told D'Amuro that he did not have a moral objection to being present for the CIA techniques because the CIA was acting professionally and Gibson himself had undergone comparable harsh interrogation techniques as part of U.S. Army Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) training." (Department of Justice Report: A Review of the FBI's Involvement in and Observations of Detainee Interrogations in Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan, and Iraq, May 2008, p. 69)
The interrogation memos note that after "enhanced" methods, i.e., harsh methods, were used on Zubaydah and KSM they became "pivotal sources" of information on Al Qaeda:
". . . since the use of enhanced techniques, ‘KSM and Zubaydah have been pivotal sources because of their ability and willingness to provide their analysis and speculations about the capabilities, methodologies, and mindsets of terrorists.'"
MYTH: The abuse of the three terrorists who were waterboarded is part of an overall pattern of abuse in American interrogation operations at Guantanamo and in Iraq and Afghanistan.
FACT: An independent review of our interrogation operations concluded in 2006 reached a very different conclusion. William Mcswain is one of the attorneys who took part in that investigation. He's in a unique position to comment on this matter, because he not only participated in the investigation but also underwent waterboarding as part of his military training. He says the following on this matter in an editorial published today in the Wall Street Journal:
". . . military interrogation is not akin to a friendly chat across a conference table -- nor is it designed to gather evidence in a criminal trial, as an FBI interview might be. There is a fundamental distinction between law enforcement and military interrogations that we ignore at our peril.
"Second-guessers can also fail to appreciate the increased importance of interrogation (and human intelligence in general) in the post 9/11 world. We face an enemy that wears no uniform, blends in with civilian populations, and operates in the shadows. This has made eliciting information from captured terrorists vital to the effort of finding other terrorists. As interrogation has become more important, drawing out useful information has become more difficult -- because hardened terrorists are often trained to resist traditional U.S. interrogation methods.
"Fortunately, aggressive interrogation techniques like those outlined in the memos to the CIA are effective. As the memos explain, high-value detainees like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), the mastermind of 9/11, and Abu Zubaydah, one of Osama bin Laden's key lieutenants, provided no actionable intelligence when facing traditional U.S. methods. It is doubtful that any high-level al Qaeda operative would ever provide useful intelligence in response to traditional methods.
"Yet KSM and Zubaydah provided critical information after being waterboarded -- information that, among other things, helped to prevent a ‘Second Wave' attack in Los Angeles, according to the memos. Similarly, the 2005 report by Vice Adm. Albert Church on Defense Department interrogation policies, the ‘Church Report' -- of which I served as the executive editor -- documented the success of aggressive techniques against high-value detainees like Mohamed al Kahtani, 9/11's ‘20th hijacker.'
"The aggressive techniques in the CIA memos are also undeniably safe, having been adopted from Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape (SERE) training used with our own troops.
"I have personally been waterboarded, put into stress positions, sleep deprived, slapped in the face. While none of this was enjoyable, I am none the worse for wear.
"While such techniques are used in U.S. military training, some apparently consider them too brutal, too abusive, too inhumane -- in short, too much like ‘torture' -- to be used on fanatics like KSM who are bent on the mass murder of innocent American civilians. And if legal advisers such as Steven G. Bradbury, Jay S. Bybee and John Yoo are to be prosecuted for having sanctioned their use under careful controls, who's next? Every commander who ever implemented a SERE course?
"Many critics also play the Abu Ghraib ‘trump card': The abuses of prisoners at that facility in Iraq allegedly ‘prove' the Bush administration's supposed policy of abuse, first codified in its legal memos. This ignores all relevant evidence.
"As the Church Report concluded, after a thorough review of all Defense Department interrogation policies, the pictured abuses at Abu Ghraib bore no resemblance to approved policies at any level, in any theater. The 2004 Independent Panel to Review Department of Defense Detention Operations -- whose four members included two former secretaries of defense under President Jimmy Carter -- also stated that ‘no approved procedures called for or allowed the kinds of abuse that in fact occurred. There is no evidence of a policy of abuse promulgated by senior officials or military authorities.'
"Similarly, the critics like to default to Guantanamo as a symbol of the kind of abuse that Mr. Bush's antiterror policies allowed. Yet, at the time of the Church Report, there had been more than 24,000 interrogation sessions at Guantanamo and only three cases of substantiated interrogation-related abuse. All of them consisted of minor assaults in which military interrogators had exceeded the bounds of approved interrogation policy. Notably, the Church Report found that detainees at Guantanamo were more likely to have been injured playing recreational sports than in confrontations with interrogators or guards." ("Misconceptions About the Interrogation Memos," Wall Street Journal, April 26, 2009; see link below)
Again, the full version can be found at the link given above.